The great German patriot, lawyer and revisionist Jürgen Rieger died suddenly fifteen years ago today – 29th October 2009 – aged 63.
He was politically active until his final breath – in fact he was taken ill during a meeting – and his final essay remains a valuable contribution to revisionist history.
His remarks on the sinister role of Viorel Tilea – the chief Romanian diplomat in London – are of particular interest and have been validated by more recent research which will be discussed in a future post on this website.
We republish Jürgen Rieger’s 2009 essay today as a memorial tribute (in an English translation by J.M. Damon):
Once again we have another round-number date to observe: the 70th anniversary of the invasion of Poland. Once again we are told that we must observe it with “shame and guilt.” We must declare ad nauseam that “…never ever again from German soil…” etc., etc. But what else could we expect from such an occupation regime as ours?
As the Springer publication Welt am Sonntag laments in its issue of 30th August 2009:
“…It is discouraging that at the solemn and imposing Polish observance of the beginning of the War, which took place at the place where it began, the Danziger Westerplatte, no heads of state of Western nations participated except Angela Merkel.”
We are told that it would have been a good thing
“…if the West, through its presence in Danzig, had solemnized the great suffering that occurred in Eastern Europe and not just Poland.”
In other Establishment publications the story goes that Adolf Hitler on 1 September 1939 “ignited World War II;” “released world conflagration;” “set out to conquer the world” … and other such claptrap!
THE TRUTH is that the German-Polish war began on 1 September 1939, and this local war became a European war with England’s and France’s declaration of war against the Third Reich on 3 September. The European War became World War II on 12 September 1941, when President Roosevelt instructed the American navy to sink any German warships it encountered. (On that occasion the American Secretary of the Navy remarked laconically that “the US had entered the war but the American people did not know it yet”.)
THE TRUTH is that Poland, which had long been under Russian rule, was re-established as an independent state by Germany and Austria in 1916. As thanks for this generous act, regular units of the Polish army joined Korfanty armed bands and began seizing purely German districts in Upper Silesia and Western Prussia. In response to German electoral victories in every region that held a plebiscite, they initiated a reign of terror; and thanks to French backing, Poland was allowed to keep these German districts.
Under the Dictate of Versailles Poland was given a “corridor” to the Baltic Sea, along with large areas of West Prussia that were populated by Germans. This “corridor” completely separated East Prussia from the Reich, making trade and communication difficult or impossible. During Allied discussions on the peace treaty, Lloyd George, the English Prime Minister during the First World War, tapped this spot on the map and predicted “This is where the next world war will begin!”
Unlike the Western leaders, Hitler had realistically evaluated the dangers posed by the Bolshevik Soviet Union. He realized that Germany would be unable to resist the Soviet Union without an alliance with Poland. For this reason he signed a non-aggression treaty with Poland in 1934. President Pilsudski in turn realized that Poland could not simultaneously conduct hostilities against its two powerful neighbours Germany and the Soviet Union.
In addition to seizing German districts, Poland had grabbed White Russian and Ukrainian districts after the Russian Empire had been weakened by the First World War. The present eastern border of Poland, which the Soviet Union established in 1939, corresponds to the ethnic border. With its wars of aggression, Poland had overreached this line, making the Soviet Union its enemy.
The German minority had been disfranchised in the 1920s, and in the 1930s it was subjected to open terror, murder and rape, especially in the months preceding September 1939. Under the nonaggression treaty German newspapers were not allowed to report on Polish atrocities against the minority Germans, which led to the emigration of a million Germans. Another million remained behind in German regions that had been seized by the Poles.
A popular song about the Poles that originated among the fighting home defense units in Upper Silesia was rewritten in National Socialist songbooks to suggest that the struggle was not against “Pjorunje” but rather “Bolschewike.”
Hitler badly wanted an accommodation with Poland. Until the month of April 1939, National Socialist propaganda continued to include the names of deceased President Pilsudski and Foreign Minister Beck among the “great statesmen of Europe.”
In contrast to his generals, who with their friends and relatives had had large landholdings in the regions now occupied by Poland, Hitler did not insist on re-establishing the 1914 border. Instead, he offered the sizeable concession of limiting Germany’s demands to a plebiscite in West Prussia and nowhere else.
He proposed that in the event the plebiscite favoured Germany, the city and harbor of Gdingen [Gdynia in today’s Poland] would remain Polish territory, along with an extraterritorial freeway extending from Poland through West Prussia to the harbour. In case the plebiscite favoured Poland, Germany would be allowed to build an extraterritorial freeway from Pomerania to East Prussia so that bothersome border controls could be eliminated. In addition Danzig, which was 98% German and under mandate of the League of Nations, would be allowed to join the Reich, in keeping with the preference of the population of Danzig.
Publicly and privately, Hitler indicated that this would be Germany’s last territorial claim since it would undo the mischief done at Versailles. Although his proposal was decidedly moderate, the Poles reacted with obstinacy, bolstered in their hard line by Britain.
For 300 years Britain had pursued a “Balance of Power” policy of allying herself with the second most powerful nation against the most powerful. This policy had allowed Britain to cover its rear while establishing a ‘world empire’. In accordance with this plan, Britain in 1935 reached a naval agreement with Germany that limited the German fleet to 1/3 the size of the English fleet. (At that time France was more powerful militarily than Germany.) Hitler wanted to assure Britain that a naval arms race would not occur again – Kaiser Wilhelm had initiated such a contest and it led to Britain’s declaration of war in 1914.
By 1938, Germany had become more powerful than France and, in keeping with its “Balance of Power” policies, Britain again adopted an anti-German policy. This led to the British government’s protesting Austria’s joining the Reich, even though 99% of Austrians had voted for unification in the plebiscite.
It is a mistake to maintain that the entry of German troops into Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 brought about a change in Britain’s policy toward the Reich. This must be said about Czechoslovakia: in this clumsily cobbled-together country, a minority of Czechs ruled three million Germans as well as Slovaks, Ruthenians, Poles and Hungarians.
All these ethnic splinter groups wanted to rejoin their nations but were brutally prohibited by the Czechs from doing so. The reason for this was that under the Dictate of Versailles, France was able to pursue a policy of aggrandising Germany’s neighbours so as to have powerful allies in the coming war against Germany.
After Austria had been reunited with the Reich came the problem of annexing the millions of Germans living under Czech rule. Hitler proposed self-determination, but the Czechs responded with increased repression. They did everything to provoke Hitler, including a general mobilization on 21 May 1938 to counter an allegedly impending attack by Germany, which was a total fabrication.
Since no attack took place, the Czech as well as French and English press triumphantly announced that their determined military measures had dissuaded Hitler from invasion, which caused the Reich to lose prestige.
The American ambassador in Paris clearly recognized the bellicose character of the Czech mobilization and characterized it in a report to President Roosevelt as a “provocation for another war in Europe.”
In order to evaluate the situation the British government sent Lord Runciman to the Sudetenland. In his report on 16 September 1938 he wrote:
“I have great sympathy for the cause of the Sudeten Germans. It is difficult to be governed by a foreign nation, and my impression is that Czechoslovak rule in the Sudetenland displays such a lack of tact and understanding, and so much petty intolerance and discrimination, that dissatisfaction among the German population must inevitably lead to outrage and rebellion.”
Following this, the British government joined in urging the Czechs to allow a plebiscite in Sudetenland. The French government, which had a mutual assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, did the same, since France was not prepared to go to war with Germany over the Sudetenland. The Czech Government rejected the suggestion of a plebiscite because this would have served as precedent for other national minorities to demand plebiscites as well. However, they agreed to relinquish the Sudeten districts without plebiscite since these regions bordering the Reich were populated almost entirely by Germans.
This is how the “Munich Agreement” came about. It resulted not from threats and extortion by Hitler, but rather an agreement by all parties that the Sudeten Germans rightfully belonged “Heim ins Reich” (back home in the Reich.)
It is important to note that both Britain and Germany agreed to guarantee the borders of Czechoslovakia as soon as its other problems of national minorities were solved. Neither Hitler nor anyone else guaranteed any national borders, since Czechoslovakia never solved its minority problems.
In March 1939 both the Slovaks and the Ruthenians declared independence, whereupon the Poles invaded Czechoslovakia and occupied the Olsa Region, which was populated by Poles. The Hungarians did the same, occupying the border areas that were populated by Hungarians.
Since Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist, its President Hacha flew to Berlin on 15 March 1939 and placed the remainder of his country under the protection of the Reich. He was afraid that Poland and Hungary would follow the Czech example and divide the Czech regions among themselves.
The Reich then formed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Maeren, which provided for exclusive Czech administration in all areas except military and foreign policy. Hitler was concerned about the threat to German cities and industrial areas that was posed by Czech air bases.
Because it felt betrayed by the Sudeten agreement and the Western powers, Czechoslovakia had adopted close relations with the Soviet Union, which had already stationed 300 airplanes in the Czech regions. Hitler, who knew that war with the Soviet Union inevitable, could not allow the Czech regions to serve as a staging area and “aircraft carrier” for the Soviet Union. Hacha remained in office and attended the parade of 20 April 1939 as a guest of the Reich, standing next to Hitler. It is very clear that Hitler did not violate the Munich accord.
When Prime Minister Chamberlain was questioned in the Lower House about the entry of German troops in Prague on 15 March 1939, he explained:
“In our view, the situation has changed significantly since the Slovakian parliament declared independence.
“This explanation produced the effect that the state whose borders we intended to guarantee collapsed internally and ceased to exist. Accordingly, the situation that the honorable Secretary for the Dominions has described, and which we had always considered temporary, has now ceased to exist.”
Just two days later, however, in sharp contrast to this explanation given in the British lower house, Chamberlain condemned the “German invasion” in his Birmingham speech of 17 March 1939; and on 31 March 1939 he signed an agreement with the Polish government in which Great Britain promised to support Poland in the event of war.
It promised to do this not only if Poland were attacked, but even if Poland should start a war – for example on account of its pretended “rights” in Danzig. Both of these contradicted in word and spirit the written message that Chamberlain carried in his hand on his return from Munich, to which he proudly referred and for which he was enthusiastically applauded by the masses. At that time he had announced “Peace in our time.”
In this announcement Hitler and Chamberlain established that all questions concerning their mutual interests would be handled in mutual consultations.
So how did it come about that England encouraged Poland to go to war against Germany?
Following 15 March 1939, Roosevelt exerted strong pressure on the British government to “finally exert opposition” against “Nazi tyranny” or else he would apply methods of coercion against Great Britain. It is impossible to determine precisely what threats he made, since their correspondence is still off-limits to historians.
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal wrote in his diary that US Ambassador Joseph Kennedy remarked that Chamberlain was convinced that America and the Jews were forcing Britain into war. This is only part of the story, however. The germanophobic senior British diplomat Vansittart and the Romanian Ambassador Tilea also played a major role.
Immediately after the entry of German troops into Czech territory, Tilea announced that during German-Romanian economic negotiations, Germany had threatened to invade Rumania if it was not allowed to exploit Romanian oil. This was an absurd allegation since Germany and Romania did not even share a common border – they were 400 km apart.
The English believed it, however, and newspapers in London, Paris and New York spread false reports of a threatened German attack. In reality, German-Romanian economic negotiations were entirely cordial. Nobody made any threats of any kind.
It could be that Tilea’s false allegations about German threats were inspired by Romania’s needing British economic assistance, and he was desperately trying to persuade Britain to grant this assistance. It could also be that Tilea had been bribed by the germanophobic Vansittart, who was determined to bring about an understanding between Tilea and Chamberlain.
At any rate, these false allegations greatly alarmed London’s financial City. The City had no economic interests in Poland and the Czech state, but it did have interests in Romania, where most of the oil fields were owned by British stockholders. The allegations moved British economic circles to take an anti-German course.
Even more significant was the circumstance that Chamberlain was neither an appeaser nor a Germanophile, as his biographer accurately points out. He simply realised that a war against Germany could not be won in 1939. Britain’s regular army was relatively small – it had just recently introduced conscription, and its air force was smaller than the Luftwaffe.
As Hitler well understood, Chamberlain was playing for time in order to displace Germany as the leading power on the Continent as soon as Britain, which had enormously increased its armaments program, would have adequate trained men and material. What Chamberlain was really hoping for was political upheaval in Germany following a declaration of war.
[Editor’s note: More recent research does not fully support this negative assessment of Chamberlain’s intentions, but does support Jürgen Rieger’s view of Ambassador Tilea’s subversive activity. More on this will follow in a later article on this website.]
He arrived at this fond hope because numerous opponents of Hitler, including the secretary to German ambassador Kordt in London, Carl Goerdeler, head of German Military Intelligence Canaris, State Secretary Weizsäcker (No. 2 man after Germany’s foreign minister) and Army Chief of Staff General Beck had joined the opposition and established contact with the British government.
Initially, in view of the universal principle “my country right or wrong,” the British had assumed that contact by the German Opposition was a trick to make them take hasty action. On the basis of very precise details reported to them, they now assumed the honesty and correctness of the figures provided by the Opposition. For example, Hitler was surprised by the sudden mobilisation of the British Fleet, excavation of air raid shelters and drills with gas masks in London in the summer of 1939. These had come as a response to a report by Opposition figures to the effect that Hitler was plotting a surprise attack with over a thousand bombers.
The British journalist Ian Colvin, who was in quest of a “scoop,” had close ties with the British secret service, and met with Opposition circles that included high-ranking officers. The officers told him that Britain’s agreement in the Sudeten crisis had denied them the possibility of displacing Hitler and the National Socialist regime in a putsch. They suggested that Britain adopt a much harder line against Germany, including a declaration of war. They believed this would make Hitler so unpopular in Germany that the generals would be able to overthrow him.
On 29 March 1939, before the British-Polish Pact, Colvin met with Chamberlain at the instigation of Churchill. He told him that there was a good chance the German generals Beck and von Witzleben, H. von Bismarck and Major von Kleist-Schmenzien would revolt and stop Hitler. Chamberlain then asked whether it would influence these people if Britain gave the Poles a guarantee and Colvin responded: “Yes, that would help.” The guarantee followed.
Churchill, who had said that his life’s mission was to lead another Thirty Year’s War against Germany, remarked jovially when he met Colvin again after the War: “Here’s the man who gave us the War!” Chamberlain’s diary also provides evidence that the German Opposition played a decisive role in the British declaration of war. On 3 September 1939 he wrote that he did not believe Britain could win the war and was hoping for upheaval in Germany instead. In the save vein, he wrote his sister on 10 September 1939: “What I am hoping for is not military victory, but rather a collapse of the German domestic front.”
Since the British guarantee of 31 March 1939 gave Poland carte blanche in its dealings with Germany, Poland intensified its persecutions of the German minority. Abductions became common, speaking German in public was proscribed, German associations and newspapers were suppressed, the German consul in Krakow was murdered, etc.
It is irrelevant whether Poles or Germans attacked the Gleiwitz transmitting station; whoever reads the White Book of the German-Polish war will find countless undisputed murders and assaults committed by the Poles in the weeks and months preceding 1 September 1939.
For example, ethnic Germans attempting to flee Poland were murdered and German commercial aircraft flying between Pomerania and East Prussia were fired upon by Polish anti-aircraft artillery. Such provocations could only be intentional.
In June 1939, Pilsudski’s successor Marshal Rydz-Smigly smugly addressed Polish military officers as follows: “Poland wants war with Germany and Germany will not be able to avoid war even if it so desires.” Presumably he pictured himself riding a white horse at the head of victorious Polish troops marching through the Brandenburg Gate.
German intelligence succeeded in breaking the Polish code, so that the Germans knew that Warsaw had given directives to Polish ambassador Lipski that under no circumstances could he intervene or offer concessions to Germany. In addition, the German Opposition informed Roosevelt that Germany was planning to attack Poland. They also informed the Polish ambassador, Polish government and French government, none of whom were disturbed. They were confident that in the event of war they could penetrate deep into Germany because domestic disorders would break out there.
Thus the US, England, France and Poland all trusted in the promises of the German Opposition to execute a putsch if Hitler invaded Poland and the Western powers declared war on Germany. This is surprising in view of the fact that, as several secret ballotings had shown, 90% of all Germans supported Hitler. Germany’s enemies, as well as its domestic Opposition, must have known that the Opposition had no support among the German people. Against their better knowledge they continued egging Poland and Britain into war, however.
Even on 20 July 1944, despite the heavy losses Germany had already sustained in the war, the members of the Opposition still did not have enough confidence to reveal themselves as opponents of Hitler. Instead, they prepared an explanation to be given following the anticipated death of Hitler that the SS had carried out the putsch and the Wehrmacht was now taking power. And yet, such spineless traitors as these are officially lauded by the present System as “heroes!”
The fact that Chamberlain, knowing of the Polish, French and American desire for war, gave a free hand to Polish war policies and did not urge Poland to accept the moderate German demands can be explained only by the fact that he also wanted war on 1 September 1939.
Another indication of this is the fact that in Britain the evening edition of the newspaper Daily Mail for 31 August 1939 was confiscated. The edition had carried the story of Germany’s proposals concerning the Polish Corridor as well as Poland’s response, which was general mobilisation. The newspaper was compelled to publish a different evening edition.
Occasionally the Establishment media admit that Hitler had not planned a World War on 1 September 1939. Numerous witnesses reported that he was shaken by receipt of the Anglo-French declaration of war. When this is mentioned, however, it is accompanied by the suggestion that he had been “playing Vabanque” (gambling) as he had done before, and this time his bet did not pay off.
In response to this it should be said that Hitler accurately evaluated public sentiment in England and France. Many Frenchmen were not enthused by the prospect of “dying for Danzig;” mourir pour Danzig was the phrase on everyone’s lips. What Hitler did not suspect, since Germans traditionally held sworn oaths to be sacred, was that influential persons in the military, foreign ministry and information agencies were conspiring with the enemy to bring about “regime change.” Perhaps these individuals believed the enemy propaganda line that their goal was to replace Hitler rather than annihilate Germany.
As for the German-Soviet War, there can be no doubt, in view of the revelations of the Russian secret agent Suvorov, that what the Germans suspected in 1941 is factual: The Reich interrupted a Russian offensive that, as we know today, was scheduled to begin on 6 July 1941. This explains why millions of Soviet soldiers were quickly surrounded and taken prisoner – they were supposed to be rushed from hidden positions to the border just before the attack. It also explains why huge numbers of artillery pieces and stockpiles of munitions were captured at the border, as well as millions of extra leather boots, detailed maps of the Red Army’s objectives in Germany and so forth.
When the Establishment media blather about the “surprise attack on an unsuspecting Soviet Union in 1941,” it is just one more Gigantic Lie.
[Editor’s note: The Suvorov thesis is an area where I disagree with Rieger, in the light of research since his death. Again, the events leading to Barbarossa will be analysed in a subsequent essay at this site.]
Beginning with the English-German War of September 1939 that he so ardently desired, Roosevelt violated the guidelines for neutral nations countless times. As early as 1939 he was already shadowing German merchant ships with US cruisers, who then called in British cruisers to sink them. He also seized German assets, supplied the British with war materiel on credit, “loaned” them fifty destroyers and guarded British convoys with American warships.
Hitler, who was determined not to provoke the US, responded to none of these provocations. He even forbade German submarines to defend themselves with torpedoes when attacked by US destroyers, remembering Washington’s pretext for entering World War I in 1917.
Even in the Nuremberg show trials, the hypocritical and avaricious US government did not dare to pronounce Germany guilty of conducting “offensive war” against them, since they had already been effectively at war with Germany for three months when Japan, driven to desperate measures by the oil embargo, attacked the US fleet at Peal Harbor in December of 1941.
The above is the simple unadorned TRUTH!
The longer German youth remain in school, the more they are indoctrinated with lies and brainwashed against their fatherland. After 65 years of such brainwashing, the teachers either know no better or else they are compelled to instruct nonsense.
Our Establishment media all play the same tune and our abject politicians perform never-ending kowtows to do penance for our “endless guilt” for the 60 million victims of the Second World War. We pay countless billions in tribute to foreign countries while, to quote Merkel, we must never be allowed to “go a separate German way.”
We were forced to abolish the D-Mark and abandon our sovereignty to NATO and the European Union. When German nationalists demand that at long last German schools adopt a factual historiography, it is not just a “backwards-looking” as some who describe themselves as “modern nationalists” believe. In actuality, it has an enormous political effect.
If we are unable to succeed in making German youth proud and self confident again, they will be unable to resist ever-growing foreign demands, plundering of our social security fund and squandering of our money in international banks. They will continue to be unable to resist predatory foreign lobbyists and parasitic organizations.
The most vital task of the day is to spread the truth!
The above article was written by Jürgen Rieger just months before his death fifteen years ago. Although (as with all historical work) there are aspects that have been superseded by more recent research, it remains a brave and insightful account of the events of 1939, especially in highlighting (as most such accounts fail to do) the role of Romanian Ambassador Viorel Tilea.
The premature death of Jürgen Rieger was a great loss to the true European cause. We continue to honour his memory.
